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ESSAY: LEARNING ABOUT LATINOS

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BIO:

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SUMMARY: ... To really matter, Latinos must be recognized. ... Yes, Latinos overwhelmingly indicated their desire to learn English, but survey data also reveal most Latinos speak Spanish, want their children to speak Spanish, and support bilingual education. ... But the trouble with concluding Latinos do not constitute a political community runs deeper still. ... More than anything else, a yearning to disprove these beliefs with "hard facts" appears to have shaped both the content of the survey and the interpretation of its results. ... Maybe it was frittered away by an unselfconscious preoccupation with stereotypes about Latinos and by the failure to think through how best to explore the very existence of a political community across national origin boundaries. At any rate, for all the hyperbolic statements made by the authors and the media, the LNPS didn't teach us very much about what Latinos think of a Latino political community. ... All that is reported by those surveyed in the LNPS - affinities, contrasts, variations among Latinos - naturally invites attention to the histories of each national origin group. ... Some numbers of Latinos already seem to appreciate that the entirety of political life is no less a matter of coalition and persuasion than life within our own national origin groups. ...

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To really matter, Latinos must be recognized. And to some degree, we must be understood too, yes, in all our complexity, and yet so as to be seen as a force sufficiently coherent to exercise clout. n1 That wouldn't seem to be asking too much, either of ourselves or of others. After all, basic recognition, some understanding, and occasional influence would seem elemental to membership in the national community. And today, if only by virtue of our growing numbers, enhanced interest in Latinos perhaps foreshadows a new era. Knowledge about Latinos may in the near future be as profound as it is sweeping.

Yet experience has taught us just how elusive these ambitions can be. Latinos remain most often on the outskirts of public perception. Along with Asian Americans and American Indians, we still typically occupy the shadowy category "blacks and other minorities." Even when Latinos already number more than 26 million (10% of the nation's population), n2 even when Latinos outnumber Blacks in Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming, n3 even when by 2005 Latinos will become the largest minority group in the United States, n4 even when by 2050, Latinos will outnumber Asian Americans, American Indians, [*364] and Blacks combined, n5 we still seem too often dwarfed, depreciated, eclipsed. n6
It's a familiar point, one I've been making for years, pleasing some, discomfiting others, embarrassing others still. But there are those days I feel it can't be emphasized enough. And I'd feel the same way no matter which groups of color found themselves systematically at the margins. In the motion picture Bulworth, the fictional Senator simply can't picture Latinos (or, for that matter, Asians, or Armenians, or Persians) as part of hip-hop culture, gritty inner-cities, or the political challenges our country must face. Even when Latinos now number perhaps 30% of California's population, 44% of the City of Los Angeles' population, and over 50% of South Central's inhabitants, Warren Beatty still sees right past us. Maybe I'm missing the real lesson: I should be praising and not bristling at the phrase "blacks and other minorities." Perhaps it implies coalitional possibilities, particularly in the face of radical demographic shifts, in Los Angeles and all across the country. In any event, we Latinos make it into some people's view only when we're included in this vague catchall minority squad. Otherwise we might entirely disappear from their sight - in Beltway debates, in national and local media coverage, in movies and on television and in print.

In recent years, it is true, attention has focused more than before on who we are, what we think, and how we might fit into the national scene. Breakthroughs can be notable. The April 25th 1998 issue of The Economist spotlighted Latinos On The Rise. On June 4, 1998, two days after the most recent statewide election in California, the Los Angeles Times prominently featured, as it now does after all major elections, sophisticated polling data identifying voter preferences by such categories as sex, annual family income, party registration, political ideology, religion, age, education, and race/ethnicity (White, Black, Latino, Asian). And on June 14, 1998, with even more dazzling production values and a larger audience, the American Broadcasting Corporation showcased the annual ALMA awards, where prominent Latino entertainers saluted one another for their work.

But such occasional progress often only emphasizes how much business as usual slights Latinos. In the coverage more typically provided by major magazines, newspapers, and television networks, Latinos are treated, at best, as afterthoughts and throw-ins and analogues, at worst, as wannabes and who-knows-what-they-ares and impostors. Of course, we haven't been treated any better by the major political parties. In a strange twist, the media seems now most inclined (at least for the moment) to headline this story, emphasizing the contrast between today's pandering to and yesterday's disregard of Latinos. Daily reports, op-eds, and television specials highlight, for instance, how California Republicans try mightily to distance themselves from Pete Wilson's scapegoating support of Propositions 187 and 209, while California Democrats energetically aim to consolidate their relationship with the state's fastest growing group of voters.

Bookstores across the country offer still more evidence about Latino standing in the nation's consciousness - at least if what I've learned on my travels at all pleads what more careful empirical work might reveal. Large chains, it seems, now regularly stock Christina Garcia's Dreaming in Cuban, Sandra Cisneros' The House on Mango Street, Richard Rodriguez' Days of Obligation, perhaps Earl Shorris' Latinos. Smaller independents may offer Gloria Anzaldua's Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick's, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami, perhaps Clara Rodriguez' Puerto Ricans: Born in the U.S.A., even William V. Flores & Rina Benmayor's Latino Cultural Citizenship.

But what's readily available in bookstores across the country remains far too thin. Browsing won't likely lead to the discovery of, say, Carla Trujillo's Chicana Lesbians, Alfredo Miranda's Gringo Justice, John Storm Roberts' The Latin Tinge, George Sanchez' Becoming Mexican American, or Jose Antonio Burciaga's Spilling The Beans. And, if informal accounts from authors are at all reliable, what bookstores do offer by and about Latinos sits too long on the shelves, perhaps partly explaining why bookstores don't change their purchasing and inventory practices. Readership hungry for Latino-centered books still seems limited to a relatively small coterie of teachers, students, and iconoclastic book lovers.
To be sure, Latino visibility has indeed improved, particularly over the past quarter century. But we're far from being understood, not just by others but even by ourselves. It's one thing to realize how little long-time residents of Maine know about those Latinos who pick their beloved blueberries. It's quite another to realize just how little second- and third-generation Puerto Ricans and Dominicans know about those Mexicans who now make New York and New Jersey their home. It's one thing to realize how little health-conscious residents of Seattle know about the working conditions of those Latinos who make their clothes. It's quite another to realize just how little second- and third-generation Chicanos in East L.A. know about their Honduran, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran neighbors in metropolitan Los Angeles.

The antidote would seem to be more information. We need more novels, more short stories, more plays. We need more telenovelas, more concerts, more feature-length movies. We need more histories, more biographies, more memoirs, in print and on the small and large screen. We need more ethnographies, more surveys, more impossible-to-categorize-but-illuminating accounts of Latino life. As importantly, we would seem to need better marketing of everything produced by and about Latinos. We need to trumpet, cross-reference, and advertise every imaginable source of knowledge. We need to target every outlet: weeklies and daily rags, networks and offbeat cable channels, web and journal sites, conservative, progressive, and centrist venues. We need to become ready, willing, and able witnesses, speaking to all who will listen, indeed cultivating the interest of considerable numbers who can't now imagine why they should pay much attention to, much less systematically learn about Latinos.

Most Latinos I know fully endorse this corrective. I'm talking carpenters, social workers, dental hygienists, farm laborers, kindergarten teachers, gardeners, journalists, painters, actors, domestics, elected officials, plumbers, television executives, musicians, electricians, doctors, interpreters, anthropologists, political consultants, roofers, architects. I'm talking people of all ages, colors, sexual orientations, people with multiple graduate credentials, people with high school equivalency diplomas, people who dropped out during middle school. In different yet overlapping ways, they all understand the importance of producing and circulating knowledge by and about Latinos. In different yet overlapping ways, they all appreciate the relationship between recognition, understanding, and influence. [*368] In different yet overlapping ways, they all want Latinos to really matter.

Those principally responsible for having brought LatCrit into existence would seem to share this view. n16 Certainly they aim to produce knowledge. And in producing this knowledge, they hope to help provoke changes that would improve the lives of Latinos and bring social justice to all. They see their project as inherently collaborative. Coalitions of eclectic groups and individuals must work together, as scholars and everyday citizens. Like the many others who would like to see Latinos really matter, LatCrit founders mean to spread the word, generating and disseminating facts, figures, and ideas about Latinos through means and methods as diverse as their experiences and imaginations, ultimately moving Latinos near the center of attention, in law, lawyering, and social life.

More and better marketed information may well be a central way for Latinos to gain recognition and understanding and influence. But this remedy for improving our national stature entails its own perils. More is not always better. Information generated by and about Latinos is only as trustworthy as the instruments are sound. Assumptions must be scrutinized, methods tested, beliefs questioned. Again and again and again. Even when newly excavated knowledge seems potentially enlightening, spreading the word about what we've learned can be perversely difficult. Effective marketing opportunities most often depend on just the sort of influence we still have yet to achieve. Even when available, they're notoriously treacherous to navigate. Marketing distorts as much as it reliably portrays. Sometimes evil people mangle the truth. Way more frequently, marketing falsifies, twists, and misleads even when it accurately reports information (at least in some technical sense). In getting the public to substitute new stereotypes for old ones, marketing operates like a poisoned gift.
At least when depicted in such broad terms, the hazards inherent in developing and pushing knowledge about Latinos can seem almost innocuous. But the potential damage is real: These pitfalls can delay, cripple, and even halt the march toward making Latinos matter. "That's just the nature of the beast," some might insist. And I happen to agree. Yet this sort of street sensibility can sometimes lead to a comforting self-delusion: Such hazards, we often seem to say to ourselves, are not the sort of things any of us would permit easily to happen, much less invite or court. I'm not so sure, though. In the name of recognition, understanding, and influence, in the name of making Latinos really matter, how many of us have ever exaggerated what we do know? How many of us have ever concealed what we do not know? How many of us have ever ignored a truth we found uncomfortable? How many of us have ever denied some facts we found difficult or impossible to reconcile with what we would like to believe or at least project to the world? How many of us have ever hyped one image, one analysis, one meaning rather than others in order to grab attention? How many of us have ever nudged aside some account of events, some portrait of a community, some nagging philosophical Pdox simply because we didn't want others to notice?

Instead of denying the hazards we perhaps inevitably confront in producing and pushing knowledge about Latinos, we should regularly expose them. Instead of running from our own failings in the course of our professional work and everyday lives, we should face them down. Examples are not that hard to uncover. Recall only this or that kitchen conversation, public policy report, campus debate, television commercial, movie trailer, op-ed piece, scholarly paper. Indeed, each of us probably has a list of notorious favorites. Perhaps we even share them with close friends or allies. Driven by ideological friction or personal animosity or even a I can't-quite-figure-why-this-bothers-me-so-much reaction, we find some embellishment, some dissembling, some denial especially troubling. Others we seem to excuse more readily, perhaps because we discount the costs imposed in light of the benefits conferred, perhaps because we delight in the artistry involved, perhaps because we see the particular failing as all too familiar.

In any case, all these examples - especially irritating ones and seemingly benign ones - merit our attention. Don't misunderstand. We'll never entirely avoid the pitfalls inherent in producing and disseminating knowledge about Latinos. We'll never even know exactly how frequently or how much they undermine our collective ambitions. But our foibles, vices, and blunders can serve as chastening reminders of both the challenges we face in learning about Latinos and the frailties we bring to the task. Especially when we so ardently want to put into play Latino experiences and views, we can sometimes exaggerate, conceal, ignore, deny, hype, and nudge aside. Our beliefs, our assumptions, our methods may occasionally debase our otherwise worthy aspirations. Talking openly about failings - instead of stockpiling them for snide gossip and holier-than-thou paybacks - may help us to better know ourselves and the world we share with others. In any event, this spirit animates this essay.

I. THE LATINO NATIONAL POLITICAL SURVEY
ITS ARRIVAL

The year was 1992. It seems to have been a year where people and institutions in the United States looked at one another with renewed curiosity. It began, with great fanfare, as the year of the Columbus quincentennial. There were fears, certainly among people of color, about a one-sided celebration of Europe's civilizing mission. But, no small thanks to the concerted efforts of indigenous peoples, teachers, and scholars, the quincentennial became an occasion for considerable reflection on the history of colonialism and the profound ambivalence of its legacy in the Americas.

Any perceived need for national self-appraisal in 1992 only intensified when, as television cameras dramatically documented, Los Angeles erupted in the wake of the acquittals of Theodore Briseno, Stacey Koon, Laurence Powell, and Timothy Wind, the four police officers accused of illegally beating Rodney King. People across the country gained a new appreciation for how little they knew about one another.
Political efforts to narrow the definitions of who and what was "truly American" seemed, at least for the moment, increasingly out of touch with contemporary demographics and traditional democratic aspirations. Come November, to the surprise of many, Bill Clinton was in, promising an administration that "looked like America" in all its diversity, and George Bush was out, in part done in by Republican xenophobia. Not just government but institutions all over the country - including the media itself - were forced to give definition to an already emerged "multiculturalism," even if they simultaneously slighted or mocked it.

Enter Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John Garcia, and Angelo Falcon, scholars dedicated to developing and sharing knowledge about Latinos. At a December 14, 1992 press conference held in Washington, D.C., they made public the findings of their just completed Latino National Political Survey (LNPS). Funded by the Ford, Rockefeller, Spencer, and Tinker Foundations and published by Westview Press under the title Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics, the LNPS ambitiously surveyed 2817 Latinos - face to face interviews, often more than 90 minutes long, with 1,546 Mexicans, 589 Puerto Ricans, and 682 Cubans in 40 metropolitan areas. The authors offered their study as a partial antidote to the ignorance, neglect, and groundless speculation that often typify this country's knowledge of and interest in Latinos. They hoped to initiate a new era where Latinos themselves might describe how they see one another and the world around them.

The very availability of the LNPS marked yet another milestone in the campaign to get the nation to recognize and understand Latinos. In 1980, largely in response to public demands for and professional suggestions about how optimally to gather better information about Latinos, the Census Bureau for the first time included categories that enabled people to identify themselves by national origin as well as by race. The data collected provided a basis for carefully documenting what many marketing departments, community activists, politicians, and scholars already had perceived: Latino populations across the United States varied in their national origins and in their particular configurations. There were people of many origins (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, Ecuadorian, Honduran, Columbian, Haitian, Venezuelan) and many who simply identified themselves as what the Census Bureau termed "Other Spanish/Hispanic." And the 1980 census data offered a mapping of the numbers and distribution of these populations, helping to redress the "undercounting problem" that so habitually undermines the fair distribution of government monies.

For all the promise these changes implied, the nation's knowledge of Latinos remained rudimentary at best. Independent national surveys and public opinion polls almost never systematically included Latinos as a separate population whose social and political attitudes and behaviors could be analyzed. Whenever Latinos happened to be included in some survey or poll, they were never broken down by national origin - as if roots in quite diverse countries and experiences mattered little to views about the world. In the absence of reliable survey data, claims of virtually every ideological sort were made with great aplomb about what exactly Latinos think and believe. And, particularly as Latinos gained in numbers, visibility and potential political clout, these claims seemed to be flying around with even greater frequency and stridency than before.

Together, the scholars who designed and implemented the LNPS and the foundations that funded their efforts aimed to improve this state of affairs. They wanted the information they collected to describe Latino political priorities, attitudes and behavior. They wanted Latinos to share their views about so-called core American values, to reveal their attitudes about other groups and major social issues like abortion, affirmative action, and women's rights, to voice their views about foreign policy questions, to describe their voting practices and political activities. And, at the same time, the survey's designers and sponsors wanted the information they collected to serve as a detailed demographic profile. They wanted Latinos to trace family histories three generations, to measure their own language facility, to choose their own identity labels.
Building on Census Bureau data, the LNPS's designers and sponsors wanted to gather reliable information - about specific topics, from particular groups, through refined techniques. They chose to focus on Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans, partly because of the size and political clout of each of these groups, and partly because it would have been technically and financially infeasible to survey representative samples of every Latino group. n28 And, principally interested in exploring relationships to the polity, they surveyed only those who were eighteen years of age or older, carefully distinguishing between citizen and non-citizen Latinos, and between the 2817 Latinos and the 456 non-Latino whites (Anglos) surveyed. n29

Aware of their own significant ambitions, the authors and their funders took special care in designing and implementing their survey. They explored the relative advantages of different sample designs, of in-person versus telephone interviews, of permitting the respondents to choose between Spanish or English, of pursuing new or familiar issues. n30 They consulted and employed some of the most distinguished social scientists in the country. n31 They borrowed some [*373] questions from established surveys and from the work of other experts, and they generated new questions from their own past work, from the feasibility study that informed the final survey, and from a series of focus groups interviews. n32

Even with the fastidiousness that distinguished its conception, the LNPS might never have attracted much attention. Left to the brutalities of the book world, many a worthy study seemingly vanishes without a trace, almost upon publication. But the LNPS authors and funders were no less ambitious about packaging the information for public consumption than they had been about the design of the survey itself. With the help of a public relations firm, they packaged their conclusions and comments in a manner shrewdly calculated to capture national publicity. They chose to present their data in the format most frequently used by public officials and the media. n33 They actively sought immediate and wide dissemination of survey findings through press releases and, perhaps most rousingly, a press conference held in the nation's capital. n34 Focusing attention on the nation's 25 million Latino inhabitants, they unashamedly marketed their ambitious survey, permitting those Latinos they interviewed "to speak for themselves" to the rest of the country. n35

The "press kit" hit the jackpot. The next several mornings newspaper readers across the United States, from Los Angeles to New York and places in between, could hardly miss prominent, often front-page, animated stories about Latinos. "Poll Finds Hispanics Desire to Assimilate," said the New York Times; n36 "Hispanics Feeling at Home," declared USA Today; n37 "Latino Survey Finds Some Surprises" remarked the San Diego Union Tribune. n38 The LNPS met with the nearly the same excitement among scholarly book reviewers. "The importance of Latino Voices and LNPS," said one knowledgeable reviewer, "cannot be overstated." n39 While national surveys of other groups are common, the LNPS was "only the third national survey of the Mexican American population... [*374] the first that is explicitly political in its design, focus, and objectives... [and] the only nationally representative survey which includes two other major "Spanish origin" groups in the United States, Cubans and Puerto Ricans." n40 "The Latino National Political Survey," with praise fairly capturing then prevailing sentiment, "is a landmark study which will set the research agenda in Latino political studies for years to come." n41

Getting so many to zero in on Latinos was an achievement for which everyone associated with the LNPS could be proud. The LNPS had been conceived as a mechanism for creating a profile of Latinos. Such a profile could be smoothly absorbed into the country's consciousness, which then might more likely count Latinos in national consensus making. The idea was both to create awareness where there was none and to counteract the stereotyping that shaped such awareness as did exist - stereotyping built around fears of Spanish as an instrument of national disintegration, fears of identity politics as a vehicle for "Balkanization" and "tribalization," fears of "minority" takeovers in cities like Miami and states like California. n42 Even if these aspirations might ultimately prove elusive, spotlighting Latinos (for any period of time) was itself a notable break with the past - a conspicuous triumph.
This was not an instance of more sizzle than steak, however. If shrewd promotion best explains the early attention, the LNPS did indeed offer interested consumers a rich body of information documenting how a wide range of Latinos think and act. The survey describes Latino social characteristics, attachments to the United States, psychological orientations, linguistic and media use patterns, attitudes toward public policy issues, and problem-solving strategies. n43 This information might spark debates - in short time, might ignite interest in learning still more about this country's Latino population. (The authors themselves announced their plans for a series of publications exploring particular dimensions of Latino life captured by the survey's data.) n44 Perhaps careful investigation rather than sloppy speculation might in the future distinguish the attention paid this country's Latinos. At any rate, both the immediate [*375] attention and the final product seemed to justify the resources expended.

ITS DISTORTION

For all the justifiable jubilation, reports of the LNPS - of its existence and its findings - were nearly as disturbing as they were thrilling. Take immigration policy. Survey data showed significant Latino majorities agreed with the statement "there are too many immigrants coming to this country." n45 And, to make certain no one missed the point, the survey's authors and the media stressed this finding, often trumpeting it as a dramatic revelation. n46 As a result, the LNPS almost instantly became a handy citation for anyone wishing to document Latino support for an assortment of anti-immigration policies - and, if memory serves, there were then proposals floating around to increase the powers and numbers of border agents, to charge fees at the border, to deny undocumented residents access to public medical care and schools, and even to amend the constitution to deny citizenship to U.S.-born children of undocumented residents. n47

The trouble with this "Latinos favor anti-immigration proposals" story was that there was little evidence to support it - in the LNPS or anywhere else. It is one thing to support the statement "there is too much immigration," quite another to back a proposal to constitutionally obliterate citizenship by birth. Indeed, answers to other questions in the LNPS might even be interpreted to suggest the "Latinos favor these anti-immigration proposals" accounts perhaps had it backwards. Only 7 of 1584 Latinos responding named immigration as the most important national problem; n48 only 15 of 1587 (14 from among the 292 Cubans surveyed (4.4%)) listed immigration as the most important local problem. n49 As both a national and a local problem, immigration ranked far behind "social problems" and "economics." n50 Those Latinos surveyed were divided over whether citizens should be hired over immigrants applying for the same job, with 54.7% of Mexicans and 55% of Puerto Ricans sup [*376] porting and 58% of Cubans opposing this position. n51 But read as a whole, the data hardly tell the story of throngs of Latinos ready to back anti-immigrant policies. More than a little speculation, more than a little sloppiness, more than a little bias seemed to be at work in passing along what the LNPS said and what those Latinos surveyed thought.

If this hardly seems the way to let Latinos "speak for themselves," perhaps such distortions reveal how little we appreciate the nature of the surveys. Survey research, no matter how meticulously undertaken, can only do some things and not others. This should come as no great surprise. n52 Every research tool is well suited to some but not all aspirations. That's true of the ethnography of the cultural anthropologist, the narrative of the critical theorist, the computer modeling of the cognitive scientist, the interview of the journalist. But surveys seem to invite uncommonly loose use. They have become increasingly central to what we know and how we think, particularly where they fill a large void, as the LNPS did. And most of us probably never much bother to assess the limits of survey research. In any event, we all perhaps lose sight of limits when pressured to come up with something nifty or edgy to say. When approval ratings, story deadlines, elections, grants, and profits turn so often on having something decisive to offer, we may find ourselves making more of any scrap of evidence than might otherwise be justified.
Yet making responsible use of research - of every sort - means disciplining ourselves to recognize the boundaries between what we've learned and what we still don't know. A survey is a snapshot. It freeze-frames the present. This does not mean that a survey cannot direct attention to or even perhaps inform us about past and future events. But a survey principally speaks to the future only through speculation. And it principally speaks of the past only through inference. Indeed, answers to questions about the past are influenced in ways too few of us seem regularly to acknowledge. What we know after the fact about the past necessarily changes the way we now look at what we used to think. These limitations are hardly lethal or contaminating. But they clarify what a survey can tell us. And they imply how we might go about making sense of what information such research provides.

Take the LNPS. The survey assembles evidence about what a large number of Latinos think in response to a wide range of questions put to them between August 1989 and April 1990. But it does [*377] not tell us about any entangling factors - from traumatic national events to pressing family crises - that may well have skewed certain responses. Nor does it provide any of the relevant histories - of Mexicans, of Puerto Ricans, of Cubans - that permit us to make basic sense of the information gathered. How can it not matter to any first-rate description of LNPS findings that Puerto Rico was claimed by the United States at the end of the war with Spain in 1898 and that Puerto Ricans are automatically American citizens at birth? n53 How can it not matter that in 1848 Mexico ceded what was to become the southwestern United States as a condition of surrender at the end of the Mexican American War and that ever since Mexicans have traveled back and forth across a border that, during many periods and in many places, served as a reminder of the increasingly interdependent relationship between Mexico and its former territories and citizens? n54 Yet the LNPS is entirely silent on these issues, leaving its consumers to fend for themselves, often without much knowledge of relevant histories or contexts.

At times, scholars try to sidestep the relevance or at least diminish the importance of such limitations. Rather like judges in our legal system, they present themselves as neutral figures simply reporting the "facts" as they find them; they see themselves as providing through their surveys raw reliable data. But facts are never an unbiased report of the world, in survey research or in judicial rulings; facts inescapably grow out of interpretations and judgments. The reasons are as much practical and cognitive as they are ideological and cultural. n55 Because survey research is limited by both time and money, scholars can never ask every question. As a result, great effort goes into deciding which goals to pursue and which questions to include. And inevitably the criteria employed to make these judgments reflect some person's, some group's, some institution's predispositions about how best to capture what those surveyed think.

These reminders about the inherent limits and biases of survey research are hardly novel. As much as anything, they seem grounded in prudence and common sense. To my way of thinking, anyone consulting the LNPS to learn what Latinos regard as the cause of Mexico's economic crisis, for example, would be well advised to note that respondents were asked to choose between two [*378] options ("U.S. policies are a major cause or government corruption and inefficiency in Mexico are an ever greater cause of Mexico's problems"). And they'd be equally well advised to investigate whether divergent histories might well account for any contrast between the responses of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. n56 Admittedly, taking account of such limits and biases makes using survey research like LNPS a more painstaking task. Aware of constraints and prejudices, we cannot so readily generate sweeping conclusions, so glibly craft snazzy headlines, so brashly declare new truths. But, if the real point of studies like LNPS is to advance our knowledge of and our curiosity about Latinos, is this really so much to ask?

If certain distortions of the LNPS stem from our inability or unwillingness to deal honestly with the limits of survey research, others seem perhaps to originate in the dynamics of aggressive marketing. Media reception of the LNPS focused on four issues where results, it was said, contradicted prevailing stereotypes: (1) those interviewed overwhelmingly supported the need to know English; (2) significant majorities (around 70%) said there was too much immigration; (3) large majorities expressed love for and pride in the United States; and (4) sizeable numbers expressed differences between, and little identification with,
Battling stereotypes has its virtues. For too long, images of Latinos have been dominated by complicated and even contradictory myths propagated by many non-Latinos and more than a few Latinos. In these myths, Latinos seem to be portrayed, at once, as pitiable and contemptible and as frightening and suspicious, as brave and upright and as unpatriotic and untrustworthy, as reliable and hardworking and as irresponsible and unambitious, as politically liberal and as almost "pre-politically" conservative, as uncomplaining and resourceful and as resentful and self-victimizing, as attached to the United States and as refusing to control immigration, to learn English, or to become "American." Obviously, Latinos should not have to accept as authority others' view of who they are and what they're like. And anyone willing to call these depictions into question should be commended. But in setting out to redress caricatures of Latinos, at least some members of the media contributed to, perhaps even deepened, the very problem they ostensibly set out to remedy.

Media reports tended to cast LNPS findings in strongly categorical terms. To phrase one observer, most mainstream press accounts would have readers believe the survey had uncovered a set of new truths: Latinos are anti-immigrant. Latinos reject bilingual education. Latinos are anti-affirmative action. Latinos have nothing in common. Ever anxious to say something definitive, at times appearing delighted with the opportunity to pull the rug out from under politicians of every ilk, most members of the media described Latinos in the language of absolutes. They looked to particular findings in the LNPS, ignored others, and converted whatever they found provocative into headline-friendly conclusions. "Throw out everything you might have believed," accounts seemed to say to readers and listeners, "Latinos are nothing like what you think. In fact, they're the opposite."

So what if a careful reading of the LNPS discredited the media's inventive reality? Yes, many Latinos agreed "there is too much immigration," but survey results do not support the label "anti-immigrant," particularly with all it connotes in increasingly nativistic times. Latinos overwhelmingly indicated their desire to learn English, but survey data also reveal most Latinos speak Spanish, want their children to speak Spanish, and support bilingual education. Yes, many Latinos rejected strict quotas but even more see the need to mix merit and quota aims in employment and college admission decisions. Yes, Latinos do not express in their responses a sense of common culture, do not consistently form consensus on certain policy issues, and do not prefer a common self-identifying label to their own respective national origin labels. But Latinos do share a great deal (common languages, concerns about economic, social and political issues), manifest uncommon agreement on many domestic policy issues (increased government spending on health, crime, drug control, education, the environment, child services, and bilingual education), and prefer a pan-ethnic label (Latino or Hispanic) as their second preferred way to describe themselves.

But why should members of the media have been worried about subtleties and qualifications, much less inconsistencies and incongruities? They were out to grab headlines, to show how much the LNPS confounded "conventional opinions," to blow the minds of those whose views were dominated by ugly myths. Insofar as the media aimed to demonstrate that what looks to outsiders like a homogeneous bloc looks to insiders like nothing of the kind, the point is worth making. But in reporting on the release of the LNPS, members of the media substituted new stereotypes for old ones. And they did so knowing full well that most of their consumers probably would never buy or read Latino Voices.

What the media reported may well be all that most people are ever likely to learn about the LNPS. But it is hardly all the LNPS has to tell us, much less all Latinos have to report about themselves. What the media neglected in its coverage is at least as instructive as survey findings it reported. Many important chunks of information (on the appropriate role of government, on public participation, on media use) never made their
way into public conversation. n66 Others (views on ethnic consciousness and discrimination) the media typically rendered in sketchy, simplistic, and ultimately misleading fashion. n67 The upshot was to leave consumers with a slanted sense of how Latinos compare to Anglos and with little idea of how to construct an account of American political views that encompasses Latinos.

In the popular imagination, for instance, Latinos often seem identified with traditional Catholic dogma, polarized gender roles, and conservative family values. That may well be true. But the LNPS revealed some arguably stereotype-defying views that, one would have imagined, should have been of considerable interest, though admittedly aesthetically cumbersome to report. When asked to note on a 1-5 point scale their views of women's roles (1 signifying "women [are] better off if they stay home and rear children" and 5 signifying "women [are] better off if they have careers and jobs"), 40% or more from each Latino group chose 4 or 5, roughly 30% chose 3, and weak minorities chose 1 and 2. n68 Among women [*381] respondents, marginally more Anglo women chose 1 or 2 than did women from any of the Latino groups. And fewer Anglo women and men (22.8% and 29% respectively) chose 5 than did women and men from any of the Latino groups (Mexican 37.7% and 41.2%; Puerto Rican: 41.2% and 34.8%; Cuban 37.9% and 33.3%). n69 It is true that about one-third of all Latinos surveyed thought abortion should be available only in case of rape or incest. But here details matter too. Cubans were by far the least likely to ban abortions under all circumstances. And more than 28% of Puerto Ricans, more than 35% of Mexicans and more than 36% Cubans said "[a] woman should always be able to obtain abortion as a matter of personal choice."

A small number of questions concerning foreign policy produced still other interesting results overlooked in media accounts of the LNPS. On whether the United States should normalize relations with Cuba, for instance, all three Latino groups split, with majorities (56-66%) opposed. n71 Among Anglo respondents, however, a slim majority (50.9%) supported normalization, despite a firm policy and a zealous campaign to the contrary. n72 To be sure, we may confront a "sampling problem" in relying too heavily on such a finding: Those Anglos who participated in the survey live in the same geographical areas as those Latinos who were interviewed. n73 But the media never invited their public to consider such details, particularly about LNPS information they never bothered to report.

For that matter, what consumers did see frequently camouflaged related intricacies. That relatively few respondents participated in ethnic movements and organizations was frequently interpreted, for example, as establishing a low level of ethnic consciousness. Indeed, reports emphasized the inappropriateness of a politics based on what the authors call "narrow ethnic appeals." n74 What the media failed to note, however, scrambled the picture. With great frequency, those surveyed in all three groups described their social and institutional lives as largely shared with others from the same national origin group, presumably a strong signal of healthy ethnic ties. n75 Much too was made by the media of the strong majorities who responded that they had not personally been discriminated [*382] against because of their national origin. n76 Yet the same accounts too rarely acknowledged that equally large numbers believed discrimination against Latino groups (as well as others) does exist. n77 Such complex findings do not lend themselves to breezy reconciliations; they invite closer scrutiny, extended debate, and the attention of future studies. But shouldn't the media have wanted to recount heterodoxies of all sorts - especially when the very ambiguity of the information underlines the need for even greater care and precision in reporting about Latinos?

Maybe the media's choices about what to cover and what to obscure merely reflect the influence of conservative ideology, particularly the recent push to describe Latino citizens as compPle (or at least not a menace) to mainstream America. When Latinos indicated greater affinity with Anglos than with other Latinos, for example, the media reported Latinos do not like or respect each other and prefer to associate with members of the dominant culture. n78 But read against the background of everyday Latino life, these answers would seem more likely to reflect the simple fact that, until quite recently, the great majority of Latinos have lived closer to and have had much more contact with Anglos than with members of other Latino groups. n79 And when Latinos indicated a strong desire to learn English, the media treated these
answers as expressing an unequivocal desire to assimilate in the strong sense of already having become or wanting very much to become just like Anglo Americans. Yet read against a long history of using both English and Spanish, these answers would seem to reflect more a complicated remaking of American culture than a simple-minded acquiescence in Anglo sensibilities and preferences.

Perhaps the media's decisions simply reveal the presence of too few Latinos on staffs and editorial boards. Certainly those stories at all comfortable with a more intricate view of Latinos were written disproportionately by Latinos. Indeed, Latinos were most prominent among those in the media who raised questions about the coverage of the LNPS. They wondered about the tendency to offer simplistic takes on complicated groups of people; they worried about the impact of such reporting on the image of and future interest in Latinos. In the world of the media, perhaps particularly among those print journalists most responsible for coverage of Latinos, the very concept of diversity seems only tenuously to have taken hold. From this perspective, coverage of the LNPS may simply have been another in a long list of casualties.

Yet trying to assign a single ideological explanation for the media's coverage may well be futile. Certainly we should avoid the national penchant for simplifying complex issues - you know, "one cause, one blame, one corrective program, and let's get on with it." And, in a similar vein, stressing the absence of Latino journalists as pivotal in the coverage of the LNPS seems naive and perhaps disingenuous. Certainly it ignores coverage by Latinos and Latino publications that mimicked or at least paralleled non-Latino coverage of the LNPS. What we may all need to confront is the degree to which the media's judgments say something about us all. And it is not very flattering.

Still, the LNPS authors seemed to have played their own role in the media coverage. From the book's opening sentence, they seem focused on assuaging concerns about Latinos. (Or in the words of one 23-year-old Columbian observer, they seem to have assumed an "apologetic posture." The ready-made quotes they provided stressed findings that, they emphasized, should set Anglo minds at ease.

Don't fear us, seemed to be the message. Still the survey's authors seem to disavow any role in the treatment their survey received. In response to questions about the media's tendency to misconstrue the LNPS, one of the authors said, "We put out facts. People are misinterpreting these facts according to their own agenda." And some six months after their own highly successful news conference, another author emphasized the one-sided, ideologically-driven portrayals of complex data.

But the authors sell their own influence short. Their selections of findings to accent and to downplay - both in their book and certainly in their dealings with the media - would seem to have established the very patterns the media traced from the day of the survey's release. Perhaps originally the authors merely were responding to caricatures of Latinos propagated for decades. But the release of the LNPS seemed only to feed the media's tendency to pigeonhole. We may be dealing with an instance of circular causation: The authors and the media immediately reinforced one another's ambitions, creating a pernicious multiplier effect. Indeed, the media and the authors seemed to be acting in concert, not in the vulgar sense of an explicit agreement, but in the more mundane sense that their respective agendas happened to coincide. Both set out to correct what they regarded as pervasive typecasting of Latinos; both hoped to make a splash with their stories. And, more than each would care to admit, both appear trapped by the very stereotypes they aimed to rebut. We are all only left to wonder whether we too are caught in this vicious cycle.

II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LEARNING ABOUT LATINOS

To advance our understanding of Latinos, we must begin to cultivate fresh approaches. We must build on the contributions of studies like the LNPS without becoming enmeshed in the very same sequence of caricatures and counter-caricatures that dominates so much contemporary thinking. Shouldering the responsibility for developing creative lines of inquiry will require considerable resources. And ultimately it will demand the input and reflection of a wide assortment of people, organizations, and institutions.
Meanwhile, we can "rough out" some speculative ways of defining certain dimensions of life central to the LNPS and presumably pivotal to many future research efforts. Examining some possible views of political community, citizenship, self-identification, race, assimilation, history, and language may together suggest reinvigorated possibilities for making Latinos matter.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The authors of the LNPS emphasize that "overall these groups [Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans] do not constitute a political community." This view seems immediately to have found a wide audience. Many members of the media embraced the idea, as if it confirmed their own suspicions. And many quarters interpreted the finding as an indictment of both existing identity politics and current Latino political leaders. Certainly, the LNPS authors did nothing to deter these responses. Survey results discredited, the authors insisted, the very possibility of political mobilization centered around "narrow ethnic appeals." The public was reassured that, in the authors' own words, "there is no evidence here of values, demands, or behaviors that threaten the nation's cultural or political identity."

By any standard these are very strong claims. We would expect to find in the survey powerfully persuasive proof, particularly given the care with which the authors and their consultants approached the design and implementation of the LNPS. Instead, the authors base their judgment on responses showing that Latinos do not share a common self-identifying label, do not have a sense of shared "culture," and do not consistently form consensus on policy issues. These are interesting data, to be sure. But they seem a surprisingly flimsy body of evidence from which to draw such provocative inferences, especially if you are a team of social scientists challenging the carelessness with which assertions have been historically made about this country's Latinos.

But the trouble with concluding Latinos do not constitute a political community runs deeper still. With some notable exceptions, relatively small numbers of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans have historically interacted in any sustained way. Indeed, the LNPS itself asked several questions whose answers would seem to confirm, to use the authors' term, this "lack of intergroup contact." Why then would anyone expect people of Mexican origin in small town south Texas, rural northern New Mexico, and metropolitan Southern California to share a common self-identifying label? Or expect Mexicans in the Southwest to share a culture and form a political consensus with Puerto Ricans in New York City or Cuban exiles in Miami? Why should it surprise that a national survey would reveal something less than ringing Latino solidarity?

The LNPS does not flow from any coherent theory of political community - at least not one discernible in the survey itself or the text of Latino Voices. The authors never explain why they treat answers to three questions as reliable proxies for the presence or absence of "political community." Think only for a moment about all they have left unsaid. When the authors speak of "political community," do they mean a new racial or ethnic group with common traits, customs, and cultural characteristics? Do they mean a community for all political purposes? Diverse groups can sometimes mobilize for certain political purposes and still fall considerably short of forming a new racial or ethnic community, much less one for all purposes. Of course we refer rather naturally to the United States as a political community though it is comprised of people who would likely give wildly different answers to the three questions in the LNPS. So are we to conclude that by "political community" the survey's authors mean to evoke something tighter and more coherent than the national (or a state or a regional) political community, something more akin to a highly homogenized ethnic group with highly particularized political ambitions?

Over millennia social reality has made plain that the idea of "political community" is complex, elusive, and evolving. Wouldn't a group of scholars interested in determining whether such a community can be said to
exist among groups of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans want to make explicit their own assumptions? Wouldn't they want to explain why they regard the answers to some questions and not others as trustworthy indicators of political community? Wouldn't they want to specify precisely what vision of political community informs their survey and supports their inferences? No, we don't need them to write a treatise on political theory. We do need their help, however, to understand their approach and to evaluate their bottom line. Otherwise, their views are likely to be accepted uncritically or appraised unfairly.

But perhaps I'm asking the wrong questions. The authors' image of a political community may have little to do with intelligible political theory. Instead, their expectations and opinions reflect their strong desire to rebut certain prevalent stereotypes about Latinos. Time and again, the authors seem to be stalking certain popular myths: the monolithic nature of the Latino population, the movement-like quality of Latino politics, the separatist ambitions of Latino citizens and residents, the racially divisive influence of Latino solidarity. More than anything else, a yearning to disprove these beliefs with "hard facts" appears to have shaped both the content of the survey and the interpretation of its results. "Ease your mind," the authors seem to be saying, in boldly emphasizing the absence of a political community. "We're not even like one another," they want us all to realize, "much less a threat to the cultural and political integrity of the nation."

To be sure, guessing about the authors' intentions entails more gap-filling and dot-connecting than seems wise. Still, such an explanation illuminates the authors' impulse to issue overstated and unsupported conclusions about limited and ambiguous data.

I admit to disappointment in a possibility forsaken. The LNPS provided an unusual opportunity to get beneath familiar rhetoric - whether it comes from the right, the left, or the center. The authors might well have helped us grapple directly with what Latinos themselves think about the realities of and the possibilities for a Latino (and not "just" a Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban) political community. That prospect seems to have been squandered. Maybe it was frittered away by an unselfconscious preoccupation with stereotypes about Latinos and by the failure to think through how best to explore the very existence of a political community across national origin boundaries. At any rate, for all the hyperbolic statements made by the authors and the media, the LNPS didn't teach us very much about what Latinos think of a Latino political community. That seems wasteful, even lamentable, particularly for a survey that espoused letting Latinos speak for themselves.

Things might have been different too. Picture the beginnings of alternative approaches - if not in surveys like the LNPS then in other sorts of studies. While history and geography do tend to separate Latino groups in the United States, there are places where different Latinos are in contact (Chicago, Washington, D.C., New York, San Jose, Los Angeles, to name only the most obvious), where groups do interact. In Chicago, for example, where meaningful concentrations of Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Cubans, and Central Americans now live, claims have been made, by residents and scholars alike, that coalitions have emerged and a Latino community has begun to evolve. Why not generate clusters of questions that test these claims? And, yes, by all means test them honestly, with an eye toward what Latinos actually think and do, not looking simply for ready-made rebuttals to stereotypes or, for that matter, self-serving evidence of pan-ethnic claims?

In Washington, D.C., where national-level Latino organizations regularly operate, informal reports tell of explicitly shared interests. At colleges and universities across the country, where maturing Latino populations of students, staff, and faculty continue to diversify, alliances are said to be developing. And, in the area of culture and the arts, the very term Latino is thought by some to have become an identifying label for projects or collaborations with a non-nationalist pan-Latino perspective. Why not investigate the accuracy of these reports and impressions? Why not put squarely into issue precisely what some celebrate and others seem to fear? Why not go precisely where Latinos themselves insist there is political community - where economic, legislative, bureaucratic, intellectual, cultural, professional, and social aspirations seemingly draw us together?
Of course we all likely have predictions about what we would learn from such an alternative approach. I can't help but think findings would be confusing and contradictory, offering tentative support for quite diverse views of political community. They would reveal, I believe, the very idea of political community to be considerably more situation-specific than the LNPS authors presupposed. Coalitions, alliances, communities are by their nature messy enterprises - even within national origin groups. Political community is ultimately a practice, not a disembodied theory. What meaning it may have must find its origins on the ground. We must look to specific struggles and particular neighborhoods. We must look to where people coexist - confronting and avoiding conflicts, hammering out and ignoring the possibilities for political compromises, rallying against and succumbing to common foes, clinging to and neglecting overlapping ideals.

But I certainly can't confirm or discard my own suppositions on the basis of what the LNPS has to say. And neither can anybody else, including its authors. That's the shame of it all. They seem to have neglected some of the principal Latino experiences from which we could begin to get a better handle on "political community." That's what happens, it would seem, when we fail to adequately scrutinize the hypotheses that tacitly drive our production of knowledge. And that's true whether we're talking about the straightforward questions and matter-of-fact interpretations said to characterize surveys, the flights of the speculative fancy often at the heart of distinguished fiction, or methods central to any other imaginable way of learning. By paying too little attention to what's driving our assumptions and judgments, we can easily end up dulling rather than sharpening the very curiosity we need to better understand Latinos.

CITIZENSHIP

Both the survey's authors and the media often seemed to embrace the basic assumption that people are always one thing or another. In their eyes, Latinos identify themselves as Mexican American or Latino. They label themselves conservative or liberal. They accept or condemn immigration. They favor or oppose abortion. They yearn for or reject assimilation. Perhaps this tendency simply reflects survey methodology, since it seems not always to reflect the more personal views of the authors themselves. By its nature, research like the LNPS tends to codify people in sharply delineated, even mutually exclusive categories. Whatever its limitations, such research may be said to offer special insights precisely because people must make hard choices in describing themselves.

But the tendency to categorize people as one thing or another reflects beliefs deeper than, though perhaps related to, an allegiance to particular social science methods. The concept of a person as a "unified subject" - an autonomous, coherent, consistent, and definable whole - has deep roots in Western thought. Indeed, nation states have long conceived citizenship around such a model. Nations are seen as comprised of national subjects, each of whom embodies the national language, the national culture, and often the national religion. A nation's cohesion and integrity are imagined guaranteed by the homogeneity of its citizenry - yes, including its racial homogeneity. And in democratic systems, the equality of citizens is often thought insured (or even measured) by their linguistic and cultural similarity to one another.

Of course, history reveals just how much this model reflects a deeply tragic irony. Our concept of citizenship derives from what were originally structures of exclusion in modern nation states. When the country was founded, rights of citizenship were granted only to those among the nation's inhabitants who really mattered - literate, property-owning white men. Relying upon genetic, cultural, and Divine justifications, formal laws and informal conventions continued throughout most our history to treat women and people of color as undeserving of the very equality said to be central to national membership. If the image of a homogeneous, fraternal citizenry can be described as linked with a desire for producing universal equality, it was every bit as much a particular group's way of securing and insulating its own privilege. Our noblest political ambitions find their origins in a profoundly sullied past.
History reveals, too, just how vehemently our country has often resisted the contrasting idea that the definition of a worthy citizen might be dynamic and ever-changing. When the various races and nationalities that comprised Israel Zangwill's *The Melting Pot* seemed threateningly multicultural, Anglo-conformity was asserted as both a principle and a practice. n107 The message thundered. Immigrants fit for citizenship must look forward not backward, must shed their skin, must entirely acquiesce in the American way - which is to say, Anglo-American ways. n108 When Anglo-Saxon Americans "talk of the melting pot they mean by it a process in which the differences of the immigrant races will be carried away like scum, leaving only the pure ore of their own traits." n109 Cultural pluralism nonetheless asserted itself, in fact and over time, as a countervailing model of how to conceive of citizenship. n110

But, even today, Anglo-conformity strongly shapes the national consciousness, sometimes mourning its own demise, sometimes informing voter preferences, and even more often serving as a "gold standard" against which cultural pluralism must measure itself. n111

This prototype of national citizenship - of a nation's membership whose strength lies in homogeneity - deeply shaped both the design and the public reception of the LNPS. That those Latinos surveyed thought everyone residing and working in the United States should know English, for example, was often read as meaning that everyone should speak only English. n112 But the LNPS results say something quite different, as the authors themselves sometimes stressed. n113 Sizeable majorities (80-88%) supported bilingual education, mainly (70-77%) for purposes of maintaining two languages. n114 Majorities in all three groups opposed English as the official language and requiring English in workplaces. n115

It should have come as no surprise that those Latinos interviewed would not equate speaking only English with citizenship or patriotism. For generations, bilingual Latinos have worked in government, served in the armed forces, and proudly participated in the political process. And it should not have shocked the survey's authors or the media to learn that Latinos see absolutely no contradiction between citizenship and fidelity to more than one language, culture, and national origin. When so many Latinos have sided over decades with undocumented workers and political refugees, they seem to have defied hallowed views about how this nation should understand itself and how it should conceive of membership in the national community. n116

Future approaches to learning about Latinos will have to accommodate this heterodox vision of citizenship. At the very least, research efforts cannot mechanically invoke the tired notion that people must be one thing or another if they are to be understood as anything at all. Apparent quarrels, conflicts, and contradictions may well provide points of reference and sets of linear relations for many scholars and policymakers struggling to interpret the political world. But in the citizens' constitution of the state and the state's constitution of citizens, these oppositions become the very everyday entanglements that, at least in the view of Latinos, must be understood as basic facts of life. n117

To discover that groups of people (Latinos and perhaps others) may well embody seemingly contradictory allegiances and ambitions is only to remind ourselves of just how complex community has always been. The United States has never been a perfect unity; it always has been a unity of diversity, where some things are shared and others are not. In thinking of ourselves as "we," those of us in this country must learn to come to grips with a concept of citizenship more dynamic and perhaps unruly than classical political theory or conventional survey methodology has learned to embrace. n118 Otherwise we certainly will never understand Latinos, and we may never understand our own national experiment.

**SELF-IDENTIFICATION**

In asking those surveyed to choose between national origin labels (Mexican American, Puerto Rican, Cuban) and pan-ethnic labels (Latino, Hispanic, American), the LNPS seemed determined to answer, once and for all, a much debated question: Which name do those we sometimes call Latinos prefer to call themselves? To the surprise of few who have studied the issue, those surveyed ranked their own respective
national origin labels first and pan-ethnic labels second. More eye-opening than these results is the degree to which the survey's authors remained stuck in the idea that Latinos must call themselves one thing or another. They never seemed fully to consider the possibility that Latinos might use more than one label depending upon the circumstance. And they never made provisions for studying how context might influence the names we choose for ourselves.

Encouraged by the authors, media accounts repeatedly accentuated the fact that those surveyed rejected labels like Latino and Hispanic. This emphasis had powerful (and seemingly intended) implications. If Latinos reject pan-ethnic labels, consumers were encouraged to ask, how can activists and scholars lucidly make reference to a "Latino community?" And if there is no coherent Latino community, skeptics might press, how can national leaders and organizations describe themselves as representing any real constituency? Answers in the LNPS indicating a preference for national origin labels were confidently converted into emphatic claims that there is no such thing as a "Latino goal," a "Latino demand," or a "Latino view."

There is a conspicuous incongruity here. After all, the LNPS authors and the media had to refer to Latinos in order to deny their existence as a group. (The authors' book is entitled Latino Voices.) And such denials were almost invariably followed by careful citations of things Latinos do and don't think. (Even newspaper headlines speak of "Hispanic Attitudes," "Hispanic Desire to Assimilate," and "Hispanic Beliefs.") Yet both the authors and the media seemed comfortable with these inconsistencies. So focused were they on unfrocking activists, politicians and scholars, they never much acknowledged, at least at the time, how much their own rhetorical and substantive contradictions betrayed a basic reality. There are in fact both commonalities and differences among Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. And this mixed-bag of characteristics sometimes may be captured in a pan-ethnic label, sometimes in a national origin label, and sometimes in an altogether different label still.

Contrary to the basic assumption pervading the design and interpretation of the LNPS, everyday experiences tell us the ways we identify ourselves are both plural and overlapping. Self-identification is, in important regards, situational: It depends in part on who is speaking to whom, under what circumstances, and for what purposes. A Chicana speaking to a newspaper reporter or government bureaucrat may use the term Hispanic. In another setting, she might speak of "we Latinas." In speaking to other Chicanas, she might use the term Chicana, Mexican American, Mexicana, or chola. Self-designating terms can signal different degrees of inclusion, varying levels of formality, clashing visions of political militancy, contrasting notions of playful banter and racial slurs.

Of course self-identification is, in certain critical respects, self-definition. A Puerto Rican may well find solidarity among other Boricua, other single mothers, other bisexual women, other Latinas, other Blacks, and other Wall Street lawyers. She may nevertheless regard no one single group as encompassing (or even responding to) her complicated sense of being. Like the rest of us, she is of many worlds, with a need to define herself in various ways and with an intuitive understanding that the labels she finds herself using may well blur important distinctions and shift over time. In such a complex and subtle world, the search for a single self-identifying label - the search carried out by the LNPS and praised by the media - seems fundamentally flawed.

On this understanding, pervasive attacks on so-called "identity politics" - for not just tolerating but underwriting social fragmentation - seem misconceived. If differences are openly acknowledged and promoted, so the argument goes, society dissolves into ever-proliferating identity groups, each necessarily acting narrowly and destructively in its own interest. But the ways we apparently think about and label ourselves lend little support to this doomsday account. If individuals "possess" or "consist of" complex identities, society can hardly be said to fragment simply because those identities find support in group politics and group names of various sorts. No one is a member of only one group - however disaffected she might feel. Indeed, our identities would seem unavoidable exercises in coalition building. Social life is held
together not (as critics of "identity politics" insist) by homogeneity but by the dense degrees of overlap between and among identity formations.

Yet such a view does not support doctrinaire celebration. If we cannot expect to learn much about Latinos by asking them to select a label for all purposes (by asking them, in effect, to deny their basic nature), we also should not expect any formulaic answers from even sophisticated efforts to understand how we identify ourselves. Identity can be confusing - not just for survey researchers and the media, but for all of us. Because labels are situational and strategic, they are sometimes blunt and sometimes sharp instruments. They can hurt as well as heal. They can confound as well as enlighten. They can shake up the very idea of who we are - even as they apparently give life to our evolving sense of selves. A healthy dose of awe and humility is, perhaps as much as anything, what we need in order to explore the Pdox of how Latinos, like everyone else, constitute themselves time and again.

Future approaches to learning about Latinos might perhaps proceed from an account of everyday life elaborate enough to embrace the many labels we use and the many reasons why. We differ across many dimensions - class, race, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, national origin, length and region of residence in the United States. And we differ not just between national origin groups but within them. But these variations do not necessarily make us any less a group. Group identity need not (and probably cannot) imply group homogeneity. In fact, to be at all serviceable, group labels must straddle a wide range of differences. That's true of national origin labels (Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban), pan-ethnic labels (Latino, Hispanic, American), and every other sort of label we can imagine. In order to claim with others and for ourselves a name, we Latinos (like everyone else) must inevitably highlight some similarities while downplaying others.

RACE

Just as those interviewed in the LNPS were presumed content to classify themselves as, say, Puerto Rican or Latino, so they were presumed satisfied to describe themselves as "White," "Black," or "Other." Framing the inquiry this way may simply reflect, yet again, the authors' insistence that people are always one thing or another. But in formulating in this fashion the survey's only explicitly race-related question, the authors appear to speak from within a familiar archetype: races seldom mix and, if they do, the one-drop theory reigns (a drop of Black blood means you're Black). The authors apparently never contemplate, and they certainly never explore, other possibilities of reckoning race. They never seem to consider the increasing numbers of the "multi-racial" movement who, particularly in view of increased interracial marriages, resist being categorized (or having their children categorized) as "black" or "white" or any other single racial identity. Even more particularly, the authors of the LNPS never inform their views of race by what appear to be basic realities of and everyday experiences in Mexican, Cuban and Puerto Rican life.

Consider the mestizo (mixed-blood) sense of race invoked by many Chicanos. More than some would care to admit, we often classify or at least treat one another according to where we fall on a continuum from pure Spanish to pure Indian. The continuum, historically grounded in the period of Spanish colonialism, is based only partly on physical characteristics and is as much culturally as racially determined. Claims of being Spanish often have to do with being regarded as middle class, traditionally Catholic, with discriminating sensibilities - as "gente decente" ("decent people"). Near the other extreme, notions of being "Indian" ("indio") often seem the equivalent of appearing less estimable, devoted to more vulgarized religious mythologies, not very stable working class, even darkly unkempt. In the novel Migrant Souls, the late Arturo Islas captures this mestizo sense of race in the Texas town of Del Sapo. Fair skin, ancestral roots in the conquistadores, blue-eyed Catholic reserve, and carefully cultivated tastes divide family and friends alike. Whiteness, Islas reminds us, is as obviously a valuable form of property in Rio Grande life as it is elsewhere in the United States.
Much as he loved the Texas world he dramatized, Islas was among those willing to report honestly the more harmful and capricious sides of this mestizo sense of race. The polarities express the way caste and subordination operate within Chicano cultures. Gradations between the two poles refer to more or less desirable physical features and skin color, more or less esteemed behavior, more or less superior intellect. Moreover, mestizo ways of seeing the world seem to discount how those of us with African and Asian origins and how Mexico's indigenous peoples (some of whom now travel regularly to and from the United States as wage laborers) fathom race. Nor is this mestizo sense fixed. If experience is at all accurate, one does not have to look "indio" to be called "indio," and people with Indian features are less likely to be regarded as "indio" if, say, they firmly establish themselves in the middle class. And, for better and worse, seeing race is not always or perhaps even characteristically conscious. It pervades idiomatic expressions, popular images, and ideological ambitions in ways that often escape the notice even of those most damaged and degraded.

Whatever we think of this mestizo sense of race, the point is that the authors of the LNPS seemed indifferent to the very phenomena they claimed to survey. They never made central the mixtures that seem emblematic - indeed, so much at the core - of how Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans understand themselves in racial terms. They never bothered to ask questions, for example, about mulattos and their racial place in Latino cultures. They never equipped themselves, for instance, to investigate why a majority of foreign-born Mexicans and 47 percent of native-born Puerto Ricans surveyed used Latino, Hispano, or Mexican as their racial identification. Can it really be true, as I have heard from so many over the years, that the categories black and white and skin color itself as used in the United States are of little consequence to understanding our lives? Or, as others think and I've always surmised, do these claims themselves reveal the very complexity of race in Latino nations and cultures?

To be sure, Anglo, Latino, Asian, Indian, Black, and other ways still of employing racial categories intermingle here in the United States. To the extent a single question in the LNPS is up to the task, the survey's authors might well insist they captured one side of an interactive process. But future studies of the role of race should have higher ambitions. We must come more fully to appreciate how race (in its many biological, cultural, and political forms) operates in Latino life - among those who embrace it as a central concept, among those who deny its significance, among those who might well not know exactly how they regard its role in their lives. To what degree are our ideas of race choices rather than responses? In what ways do race, ethnicity, and culture overlap? What do we gain and what do we lose by regarding race as one thing rather than another? Here in the United States, race in Latino life remains too much outside our understanding. And like so many things obscured, it may well run along fault lines that explain much at the surface.

ASSIMILATION

The survey seemed fashioned to collect data about how much Latinos have adapted to - indeed become a part of - life here in the United States. The moral of the story told by and about the LNPS seems almost unavoidable: Whatever the "old ways," they have been replaced by "new ways," which themselves seem very much like the ways Anglo-Americans have continually gone about their business. It's easy to have many reservations about this story - about how it was constructed and about how it has been marketed. But, in particular, the survey's authors and the media have failed to treat the concept of assimilation with the respect it merits. A more refined parsing may well permit us to uncover far more intriguing accounts of Latino life than the LNPS fathoms. Even minimal attention to some apparently highly assimilated Latinos offers insights that might inform future work.

Making judgments about assimilation to the dominant culture requires, some insist, that we distinguish between various types. Consider the contrast some draw between structural and cultural assimilation. Structural assimilation refers to a person's capacity to rise in the hierarchy - what academics sometimes call
In the United States, such mobility requires certain levels of education, English competence, and a less-easy-to-define capacity to dress and behave in ways recognizable as reliably mainstream. Structural assimilation, however, does not inevitably imply cultural assimilation. Entering the middle class does not necessarily mean abandoning one's culture of origin and adopting wholesale Anglo culture. In fact, cultures of origin can never simply be left behind. Even a glance at this country's "white ethnic" middle classes confirms this point. The relationship between the two forms of assimilation is considerably more complex, perhaps more counterintuitive, than we have been led to assume.

Think about several Chicano medical doctors and social workers I know who practice in Southern California. They work with ease and success in predominantly Anglo settings. At the same time, they socialize with one another and other Latinos, speak Spanish, and create a distinctively Latino cultural environment for themselves. Because of the nature of their professional practices, they deal often with monolingual Spanish speakers. As a result, their Spanish actually has become more (not less) proficient on the job. And their enhanced language proficiency, to hear them tell it, has perhaps deepened their attachment to Chicano traditions and stimulated interest in the customs of Latinos from countries other than Mexico. Contrary to what classical assimilation theory would predict, the very fact of having "succeeded" in the United States seems for these social workers and doctors directly related to a more intensified "Chicano-ness" and "Latino-ness."

Or think about teenage Latinos I have met and worked with in metropolitan areas in the United States. Their views often debunk the longstanding assumption that assimilation, traditionally conceived, is the only path to success for the children of immigrants. These teenagers believe holding on to their parents' dream of "making it" means rejecting becoming part of the "assimilated" crowd whom they associate with acquiescing in lower expectations of immigrants. They do not regard themselves as in any way "un-American." They learn English while able to speak their parents' tongue. And they hope to succeed in the United States mainly by applying their parents' work ethic to education. Remaining "proud of their blood," they prefer their own national origin labels even as they get themselves ready to ascend the ladder in the United States.

Obviously, I know people who have "made it" and want to ignore or even deny their own past. And I can cite instances of virtually every variation on the relationship between moving up the ladder and holding on to the culture of one's origin. Together these examples would make the basic point. Latino experiences in this country are manifold; they resist the tidy story told by conventional accounts of immigrant assimilation. An increased capacity to function in Anglo society seems linked in different people with an enhanced, unchanged, or diminished capacity to function in Cuban, Puerto Rican or Mexican American culture. The connection between structural and cultural assimilation may well be impossible to determine once and for all. Such an admission may not lend itself to cocksure ideological claims. But if future approaches are serious about trying to get a handle on Latino assimilation, they must avoid simplistic formulations. We can no longer assume final answers to the very questions we need to ask.

All that is reported by those surveyed in the LNPS - affinities, contrasts, variations among Latinos - naturally invites attention to the histories of each national origin group. The questions begin tripping off the tongue. When did Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans each begin coming to the United States? In what numbers? With what immigration status? With what education, job skills, and financial resources? Where have they lived? Where have they worked? What has been the relationship over the years between the United States and Mexico, Puerto Rico and Cuba and has that relationship influenced the experiences of those Latinos living here in the United States?
Yet public knowledge of these histories remains shallow at best. What we know and what gets taught about Latinos - I'm now talking about 1998, even in areas of high Latino concentration - should embarrass those of us with the capacity to influence popular consciousness. Worse still, the LNPS does little to correct this state of affairs. Ignoring as it does what history may explain, the survey serves only to reinforce the ease with which nearly everyone speculates about Latinos without having an informed sense of what the past may teach us. Instead of inviting greater curiosity about Latino life - filled with debate over the course and the impact of historical events - the LNPS ironically licenses too much of the same sort of ignorance that prompted its funding in the first place.

The most cursory rehearsal of rudimentary facts suggests how history might inform much we are beginning to learn about Latinos. \[n142\] For most of this century, Puerto Ricans have been American citizens. And their migration to and from the mainland does not implicate the long arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. \[\textbf{[*402]}\] Yet automatic citizenship by birth can hardly be said to have erased the colonial relationship between the United States and the island. Even today, the choices between commonwealth status, statehood, and independence seem suffused by the economic, social and ideological consequences of United States dominance and Puerto Rican subordination.

Not surprisingly, Puerto Ricans still tend to distinguish strongly between those born on the island and those born in the continental United States. To some degree, these distinctions seem natural. As many of my students stress, public education in Puerto Rico takes place in Spanish, and the island has its own university system. And those who constitute the growing Latino "urban underclass" seem to have spent more rather than fewer years here in the United States. Yet the boundaries between the island and the mainland seem increasingly smudged. Particularly for the thousands of Puerto Ricans who have migrated back and forth between places like New York City and San Juan, life seems to draw in equal measure on two related spheres worlds. What it means to be Puerto Rican - on the island and on the mainland - seems very much in dispute, constitutionally and culturally.

The presence of Cubans in the United States is more recent than the arrival of Puerto Ricans. When in 1959 the revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro overthrew the Batista dictatorship, Cubans began flocking to the United States (especially Florida) in large numbers. Many emigres were prosperous. And they often brought with them resources reflecting their social and economic status. Generous government subsidies and widespread popular support further facilitated Cuban transition to life in the United States. In the eyes of most Americans, Cubans were fleeing a communist country and their acceptance seemed a palpable way to express a deep antipathy to the Castro regime.

By any measure, Cuban successes in the United States have been noteworthy and celebrated. As a group, they now possess significant economic resources, unusual political clout, considerable visibility, and even a certain social cachet. Press surveys reveal that, though Cubans still represent only a small percent of the Latino population, they are spotlighted by the overwhelming majority of national news stories focused on Latinos. Meanwhile, the past decade or so has seen the emergence of an intriguing diversity in the Cuban community. More recent immigrants - disproportionately young, unskilled, darker-skinned - have found adapting to life in the United States considerably more difficult than their predecessors. And some younger Cubans, raised in the United States, seem less preoccupied than their parents with fighting communism and more concerned with issues affecting all Latinos in the United States. \[\textbf{[*403]}\] Thirty years after fleeing a revolution, Cuban Americans may well be creating a community as complex as the society the first refugees left behind.

People of Mexican ancestry constitute the vast majority of the Latino population. A relatively small number have lived in what is now the territorial United States in settled towns since the 16th century. Indeed, for some inhabitants of the Southwest, the historical experience was one of standing still while the border moved southward, transforming them from Mexican to United States citizens. (The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed in 1849 at the end of the Mexican American War, ceded what is now California, Texas,
New Mexico, and Arizona, and parts of Colorado, Utah and Nevada to the United States, and gave all Mexicans living in these areas the option of becoming United States citizens or of relocating within the new Mexican borders.) At least at its roots, this is a story of conquest as much as it is story of immigration. Nor is it one of simple or pervasive assimilation, as anyone who travels to the towns and villages of northern New Mexico and south Texas can testify.

Even those Mexicans who have come to the United States as immigrants have not entered an entirely foreign land. Nor have they come to a country that did not actively encourage their migration (legal and illegal) whenever it suited its own purposes. The United States has derived, in part through the subtle manipulation of immigration law, extraordinary economic advantages from Mexican laborers, while employing familiar chauvinistic propaganda and affirming the inferiority of yet another mongrel group. Perhaps the use of Mexican labor over the years is accepted as simply pursuing the opportunities of an open economic system, while putting people to work who cannot otherwise find employment in their country of origin. Yet any fair reading would seem impelled to conclude that events for over a century have revealed a dramatic mismatch of bargaining power with the United States (and, in many ways, Mexico) insensitive to wrongs done the Mexican worker along the way.

In any event, over the years millions of Mexican wage laborers made the United States their home. Their presence has had tremendous economic, social and demographic impact in many states and, increasingly, in many regions of the country. It has become almost commonplace to point to states like California, where Mexican-origin people are totally remaking the political map and the calculus with which one plans for the next century. But in other states, like Illinois and Kansas and Washington, the Mexican population is continuing to grow at a rate that would surprise all but the most careful demographers. Of course, sheer numbers overstate the cultural and social influence Mexicans have been able to achieve, at least if one counts national visibility and conventional political clout. But few would underestimate the future influence of Chicanos, dynamic constituents in virtually every imaginable way.

These sketches cannot begin to offer a fuller picture of these histories, much less put into circulation varying accounts of how things happened and why they are as they are. Still, they hint at what we all stand to learn both by beginning to take full advantage of information already out there to be disseminated and by committing ourselves to developing even deeper and broader and more accessible accounts. We should not believe any group is reducible to its past. Nor should we insist that every contemporary event is merely the predictable outgrowth of some earlier incidents. But we simply cannot claim to understand Latinos - on their own terms or in their own voices - without a serious grounding in the histories that have established the patterns and conditions through which life continues to evolve.

LANGUAGE

Many believe language serves as a central fulcrum around which other dimensions of Latino life revolve. Certainly concerns about assimilation, social mobility, and political power often pivot around our linguistic competence. Indeed, whenever views circulate about how Latinos are faring in the United States, language seems to elicit considerable apprehension. Studying language - ours and anybody else's - is endlessly complex. But we know enough to piece together a rewarding contrast between the approach pursued by the LNPS and approaches that might be constructed in the future. The promise in these alternative approaches highlights the relevance of a familiar axiom: How we ask questions often determines what we end up learning.

Most people in the United States seem to accept English monolingualism as the model - at least whenever citizens are dealing with their government. Perhaps they hold this view because they consider themselves part of a nation of immigrants: They regard the exclusive use of English as fundamental to the nation's social cohesion. At any rate, English has long been the de facto national language. In fact, except for the brief study of foreign languages in school, in many ways bilingualism still
The story of being punished for speaking a language other than English on the school grounds is one shared by many generations of Americans of all ethnic backgrounds. In some circles, this experience is even thought to serve as one of the "ties that bind" an otherwise diverse citizenry. It's not hard to see why battles over bilingual education have been described as a "status conflict."

But those who live within this monolingual view of the world often mistake our own past. The myth persists that early immigrants, particularly Europeans, quickly learned English and abandoned their mother tongues. This conviction finds little support, however, in the historical record. Evidence reveals that most groups used and maintained non-English languages in their homes and communities for decades. Just as those who subscribe to a monolingual ideology misperceive United States history, so do they often misapprehend what's going on in the rest of the world. Speaking only one language is "characteristic of a minority of the world's peoples."

By one count, there are 160 nation states in the world today, between 5,000-8,000 ethnic groups live in those nations, speaking over 4000 distinct languages. Each of the world's nations has groups of people living within its borders who use a language other than or in addition to the national language to function in their everyday lives.

But those in the United States who see monolingualism as an ideal probably correctly intuit the geo-politics of language. For the many tongues actually spoken in the world, most nations are officially monolingual. Their laws and institutions employ only the dominant or the designated official language in interactions with citizenry. In the course of carrying out this language policy, these nations often run roughshod over the needs, sensibilities, and aspirations of those who use another or more than one language. Indeed, they typically don't appreciate bilingualism, don't try to understand those who speak more than one language, and seldom scrutinize their own assumptions about how language does or should work in their communities.

That the LNPS at all evinces an allegiance to this monolingualism comes as something of a surprise. I have no reason to believe the authors are not themselves bilingual. I have no reason to believe the authors are not in favor of bilingualism. And, to their considerable credit, they gave those surveyed the choice of being interviewed Spanish or English. Still, even if against their will, the LNPS occasionally reflects a monolingual perspective. Certainly the ways in which the authors encouraged others to interpret data sometimes betrayed misunderstandings about the nature of bilingualism, fear of the consequences of bilingualism for the national community, and acquiescence in the normative claim that monolingualism ought to be the goal to which all individuals should aspire.

Even people sensitive to and supportive of bilingualism, even people who are themselves bilingual may nonetheless study language principally as an index of assimilation. Scrutinizing language from this perspective masks the complexity of what we call bilingualism. As much as remains to be studied, research already tells us that bilinguals differ from monolinguals, apparently even in the way language is distributed in their brains. Bilinguals come in different types, with different proficiencies and experiences, which themselves change over time. Some immigrant bilinguals "boot up" in their first language even long after English has become their stronger language. Others count or pray in only one of their languages. And bilingual aphasics who have suffered injury to the left hemisphere frequently retain receptive and productive abilities in one of their two languages.

Without some attention to the biological nature of bilingualism - to how bilinguals process and store information, to how they keep their two languages apart, to whether their two language channels operate independently of each other - LNPS questions reveal less than they might about Latino use of language and Latinos attitudes toward both English and Spanish. When Latinos have responded negatively to employers requiring the exclusive use of English in the workplace, for example, their responses might perhaps chiefly reflect a practical recognition of their everyday habits. Living in a largely bilingual world, they frequently draw on two languages in the course of their interactions. Not accustomed to strictly monitoring
their language choices, they might well resist policies that would force them to consciously police themselves from ever slipping into Spanish - even if it's "only" slang or a phrase here and there. To be sure, practical resistance often results in the formal assertion of legal rights. But only what might be called a bilingual perspective on language would unpack the relationship between the two, informing our understanding of both language use and political theory along the way.

Just as studying language from a monolingual perspective conceals the biological origins of language issues, so too does it ignore the reality of how language works in Latino communities. In order to interact successfully, we are often called upon to deal with a wide range of other Latinos: youngsters who are in the process of acquiring English, newly arrived immigrants who are Spanish monolingual, second- and third-generation teenagers whose Spanish is almost non-existent, bilinguals fluent in both languages, seniors who acquired English years ago yet still feel more comfortable expressing themselves in Spanish. Obviously some of us are better equipped than others to handle all these interactions. Still, we must deal, like it or not. An appreciation of this reality - a self-consciously bilingual take on Latino life - would expose more about how Latinos (and non-Latinos) with varying degrees of bilingual expertise handle dispute everyday situations. For all we know, such studies might well change our image of what it means to be socially competent and our profile of what it means to be socially mobile.

Understanding the challenges of bilingual communities might well transform how we describe attachments to language. Experience suggests that Latinos, perhaps like other bilinguals around the world, use two languages mainly because we must. Some Latinos I know insist on being bilingual principally as a political or cultural statement. But most do not. They are bilingual more out of necessity than anything else. They have relationships with people who speak only one of two languages, and they interact regularly with others whose linguistic repertoire includes two codes rather than one. One language will not do to meet all these communication needs. Besides, there's fun along the way. In communicating with other bilinguals, Latinos switch languages within and between sentences; we experiment with Spanish and English, drawing on both to argue, persuade, console, and amuse. In participating in two linguistic worlds rather than one, Latinos transform each along the [408] way. And we do so principally because we must: Social demand more than ideology would appear to be the mother of bilingualism.

Studying bilingualism from a bilingual perspective helps to clarify why, as the LNPS itself discovered, Latinos believe everyone should learn English and, at the same time, support bilingual education. n155 We characteristically want our children to be bilingual so they can be a part of - and not in any way find themselves excluded from - the linguistic worlds in which we live. From this angle, it is perfectly sensible to support learning English, tax-supported public services in Spanish, and bilingual education. We frequently want our children to learn two languages and not just one, and we want members of our community to be informed and able to cope. Far from manifesting contradictory attitudes, those surveyed by the LNPS may simply have made plain the nature of their linguistic communities and the complexity of bilingualism.

These days, the term bilingual is often used (at least when referring to Latinos) as a euphemism for the poor, the uneducated, the newly arrived. Speaking a language other than English has become the vehicle, think some, for mobilizing anti-immigrant, anti-underclass, anti-minority sentiments. n156 Students who don't speak proficient English, we're told, present profound difficulties for educational systems ill-prepared to educate youngsters in a language other than English. Employees who speak proficient but accented English, we hear, poorly serve businesses, particularly where customers insist upon service workers who speak English in crisp, "unaccented," American tones. n157 Studying language from a bilingual perspective won't alone change the underlying hostilities and fears that impel the insistence on one-nation-one-language ideology. Nor will it necessarily usher in a more pluralistic embrace of a bilingual world. n158 But we might at least help ourselves understand how our communities work, how policies (from standardized testing to English-only) intersect with our ways of dealing in the world, and how we might pry open greater curiosity about what many of us see as among our many strengths.
Along with the authors of the LNPS, I believe we Latinos express views that cannot easily be squared with either familiar world ideologies or conventional American party politics. We seem to be approaching our lives and our country from constructively iconoclastic angles - angles that reflect perhaps more a response to our conditions than a choice of fashionable philosophy. Unlike the authors and other interpreters of the LNPS, however, I believe that trying to discern evolving Latino attitudes through stereotypes or counter-stereotypes is precisely to miss what may well be most original about our situation. In light of the ambitions that seem to have informed the LNPS, it would be a sad injustice to neglect what makes Latinos so distinctively American.

And, indeed, we seem to have entered a new phase. In the last several years, efforts to elect Latino candidates have begun to pay off. Voting rights lawsuits, voter registration crusades, community education programs, get-out-the-vote campaigns, and determined lobbying have together put more Latinos on the ballot and in office. But it would be a big mistake to treat these achievements as anything but modest and long overdue gains. In no area of the country can we be described as adequately represented by and in the governing political institutions. Certainly, the percentages of Latino elected officials still do not approach the percentages of Latino inhabitants in the population at large. For that matter, gains in representation have by no means insured changes in governance. Just check out the many problems in Latino communities for which the state still seems unwilling to respond.

Latino perspectives on American politics comprehend these mixed results, at least if LNPS data offer a reliable account. We seem to appreciate the enhanced possibilities for full incorporation in the body politic and the arrival of fully representative political institutions. At the same time, we seem to understand the continuing need for those legal, political, economic, and cultural mechanisms that, in recent years, finally have begun to counteract a history of marginalization. Government can help us make a difference, but only if we vigilantly police its policies and practices. In the LNPS terms, Latinos may "love" and "feel pride in" the United States, but we trust government officials "to do what is right" only some of the time.

While the LNPS authors and spin meisters were busy chiding established Latino leaders and "politically correct" scholars for not having acknowledged the absence of a coherent pan-ethnic community, those Latinos surveyed seem to have been trying through their self-respecting skepticism to stress a newly emerging challenge. We're no longer a people entirely on the margins of American society, those interviewed appeared to be saying. Having made political and social advances, how can we legitimately focus all our social justice claims around the idea of unjust exclusion? We're not the first minority to confront such a challenge. African Americans have faced this predicament, for example, and they seem of many minds about the quandary and how they have managed it. At any rate, we Latinos seem perhaps already to be trying to come to grips with exactly how our successes influence the ways in which we have historically marshaled our resources and articulated our positions. When those surveyed in the LNPS seem to be telling us that we may already be in the next phase of Latino politics, it seems important both to heed their message and to wonder provisionally how we might negotiate the transition.

Some pressures seem evident. Everywhere from Washington D.C. to small towns, for example, forces hostile to change seem to be telling Latinos "through elections and appointments, you've made it into the room, so now sit down and shut up." This demand, in turn, produces a fair amount of consternation and pessimism, at least among Latinos I know. They do not want to deny our new successes. But they certainly never imagined victory meant little more than becoming part of business as usual. They end up spending a fair amount of time and energy trying to fashion inventive answers to more or less the same question: How can we avoid being entirely co-opted without employing rhetoric far more suitable to those despicable days when there wasn't a Latino face to be found in nearly any decision-making body?
To some degree, we Latinos may simply find ourselves in the process of taming our own exaggerated expectations. Perhaps we clung to an over-the-top sense about what it would mean finally to integrate political life. Not too many years ago it was still easy to believe that being represented was nearly tantamount to tending a group's needs. In retrospect, such views seem innocent and romantic. But they did explain for Latinos why for so many years "Anglo America" seemed so relatively well served by the business of politics. We have become increasingly savvy, however. Many of us now know representation means winning a seat at the table, a voice in negotiations over policy, a chance to advance the interests of the represented, and the opportunity to persuade others to join in their support. "Minority representatives" still remain minorities, we now realize, often lacking the numbers to win majority votes and the resources with which to address the very concerns that prompted the need for representation in the first place.

If this lesson in realpolitik has not always been good news, it certainly puts a fine point on the nature of American social life. Once upon a time Latinos, like other oppressed groups, might well have been inclined to say "we want no part of coalitions." We assumed a stable solidarity within our own group and, when it seemed shrewd, did our best to project a monolithic unity. The world is no longer quite so ingenuous, and I doubt it ever was. Nowadays it is painfully evident that we Latinos can't function productively as part of our own national origin group (much less as part of a wildly more diversified body politic) unless we are willing to do some serious coalition work. And that, as any sane person should realize, is nothing but painstaking. n163

Just as Latinos are beginning to accept the inescapability of coalition work, we seem simultaneously to understand our capacity to act as something more than an "interest group." Those who authored and many who interpreted the LNPS juxtaposed Latino values and "core American values" - wondering how the one compared to the other. But the last several years reveal how much the very structure of the American mainstream is itself up for grabs - whether we're talking about women's rights, education, ecology, sexual liberty, religion, taxation, or the responsibilities of government to those within its geographical boundaries. Some numbers of Latinos already seem to appreciate that the entirety of political life is no less a matter of coalition and persuasion than life within our own national origin groups. And that realization itself may initiate an entirely different approach to our role in this country.

In order to shape mainstream views, we Latinos need to take ourselves seriously enough to offer our own comprehensive vision of what this democracy should look like - not just about a set of high profile "minority" issues, but about life for everyone who calls this country home. n164 This is a tall order, I realize. Broadening America's vision of itself ultimately means getting many powerful groups to abandon the (often unconscious) assumption that their sensibilities speak to everyone's needs and aspirations. At the same time, a willingness to chart a course for all people in the United States means getting more Latinos than ever before to abandon the (often unconscious) assumption that politics can never be anything but a battle of raw self-interest.

Of course, Latinos have had considerable experience in fashioning coalitions. At local levels and in international circles, we have helped piece together compacts ranging across economic, social, cultural, legal and political domains - including trade, labor, criminal, health, and religious issues. From hard experience, we have begun to appreciate that coalition politics often requires compromise. And we have reminded ourselves that coalitions, at least at their best, are something more than apprehensive alliances of segregated enclaves. At the same time, Latinos have played bigger roles in shaping substantive visionary statements than perhaps most people in the country realize. In taking stands on Supreme Court nominations and legislative proposals, we have begun to develop our own distinctive views of constitutions and legal jurisprudence. In pushing for employee stock options and worker cooperatives, we have moved to democratize markets, demanding that standards of equality and participation be extended to economic life and not just a narrow sphere of government. And in refusing to abandon our languages and traditions, we
have staked a claim to a culturally pluralist society that deliberately structures institutions so that all communities and social classes share prestige and respect.

For all this experience, we certainly have not been encouraged to take the lead in building visions of America's democratic future. To some degree, perhaps we have brought this upon ourselves. To the extent we have continued to regard our "interest group" politics as both entirely consuming and inconsistent with a more comprehensive agenda for the national community, we may well have failed to seize opportunities for taking the lead on behalf of the entire nation. But more frequently our attempts to articulate larger visions of the United States have fallen on deaf ears. Too many non-Latinos seem unwilling to imagine Latinos as creators of the mainstream - as national leaders, as originators of popular culture. And too many non-Latinos continue to box Latinos into the very same narrow brand of "identity politics" they themselves so high-handedly condemn.

If indeed we find ourselves in the next phase of Latino politics in the United States, it is testimony to what Latinos have come to understand over the years. Never expecting to be invited to play a major role in this democracy, we nevertheless have taken it upon ourselves to make the most of our situation. We have astutely been unwilling to abandon our embrace of "interest group" thinking. Yet we have not deluded ourselves into believing there is anything like a safe retreat from messy coalition work. While we have wisely refused to accede to demands to become exactly like Anglos, we have also been eager to declare openly our affinities with non-Latinos, our loyalties to our country, and our willingness to pitch in and lead.

CONCLUSION

If, like me, you count yourself among those who want to create and circulate knowledge about Latinos, then together we owe the authors of the LNPS a debt of gratitude. They thought big. They hustled serious dollars. They consulted other skilled experts. They rounded up capable staffers. They surveyed a wide-range of carefully selected respondents. They promoted their new treasure-trove of information. They campaigned for their own interpretations. They managed to get people to pay attention, at least for a while and perhaps, for all we know, in an importantly different way. By widening in the public imagination what Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans stand for, they showed us one powerful way we might help make Latinos matter.

Indeed, from my perspective, the LNPS remains in some ways underappreciated. That certainly isn't the authors' fault. As promised, they have produced an impressive literature dissecting the survey data, exploring themes they initially downplayed, deepening their analyses of topics they already had addressed in earlier work. Meanwhile other scholars have now begun to offer their own views, challenging and refining the authors' interpretations, doubtlessly creating new lines of inquiry along the way. Still, much more can be said - and needs to be said - about each of the survey's many particular findings, about its significant contributions to preexisting bodies of research, about its role in the related worlds of research, policy making, and public opinion. A research tool of genuine significance demands our close and sustained attention.

Yet we already have learned a great deal, and not just from what the data tell us. How the LNPS was assembled, boosted, and received is as much a cautionary as a triumphant tale. Much remains to be unearthed, but some implications seem unavoidable. In the name of putting an end to disreputable portrayals of Latinos and Latino views, the authors' own conduct encouraged too much of the same. They watched while others almost immediately used the LNPS as a source of prefabricated Latino opinions. After the fact, they sometimes mildly protested. But they themselves had established the precedent in the course of marketing their product and pushing their own views. Often enough the authors acted as if a definitive Latino vote had finally been taken on a wide range of exceedingly complex issues and highly particularized proposals. Little wonder others followed suit.
Yes, I realize, glitzy exaggeration seems to be the way of life these days. And the authors of the LNPS can hardly be expected to control or change all that surrounds them. But that sort of rationalization for what happened, in the survey and through the media, borders on the cavalier. Searching hard for something authoritative to say, the authors sidestepped many of the intricacies that give everyday definition to Latino political life. They crafted questions informed by beliefs they never scrutinized; they drew conclusions their information simply did not justify. Too often they behaved as if, once and for all, the telling questions had been answered. In this sense, they sold their own project short. The LNPS may well be most valuable for helping us all to realize just how much we still must learn. Genuine curiosity is, we mustn't forget, a display of respect.

Even more fittingly perhaps, the tale of the LNPS invites attention to our own work. Those who have brought LatCrit into being, like many other Latinos I know all across the country, really do believe more and better marketed information is central to recognition, understanding, and clout. Our aspirations, however, betray a conspicuous tension. We seem to want knowledge of Latinos to be more expansive, more detailed, more subtle. At the same time, we want this knowledge to be more accessible, more integrated into social policy, more a part of everyday consciousness. Maybe we can have it both ways. But, like the authors of the LNPS, we'll find out only by operating more and more in a world where scholarship hopes to become news and where news already has become entertainment.

Endless hand-wringing won't change the basic nature of what we face. Like it or not, perceptions we hope to influence now take definition in an environment where obsessive spin often dominates more straightforward forms of persuasion. Nor can we expect ever to be able entirely to control the dynamics. Even grand masters like Bill Clinton - with all his considerable resources, lifelong experience, and more than occasional desperation - can't completely control public opinion. (I agree, we all should do so poorly.) Indeed, getting into the game is itself an achievement. Relative newcomers like the LNPS authors most often can't muster up the resources, can't draw on the hard-earned savvy, and can't depend on the requisite good luck.

Sure we can run and hide. And I understand the impulse. But we'd buy our purity at the price of the very mission we've undertaken. For those who are part of LatCrit and for other academics, the message seems plain. In the new political marketplace, activist scholars are expected to sell themselves and their scholarship aggressively. Meanwhile, the burden of figuring out what is real and what is hype often falls not on some scholarly review committee or board of student editors. It falls instead on consumers. That's us - all of us. Whether or not we're in the business of producing and spreading ideas, we must learn to sort our way through what radio and television stations, newspapers and magazines, lobbying, speechwriting, advertising, and P.R. encourage us to believe. Unstable and uncertain as this may all feel, there's no other way.

That doesn't mean Latinos must stoop to the lowest common denominator. We need be, at once, students, critics, and watchdogs of the modern Information State. We must do our best to change the very patterns we're trying to make ourselves part of in the building and promotion of knowledge about Latinos. And we must watch ourselves as well as everyone else. It's a fine line between setting the record straight and issuing counter-propaganda. (Think only of the LNPS.) And, noble as our intentions may be, we're no less likely than anyone else to surrender to perversions. To make matters worse, we'll sometimes find ourselves sacrificing subtlety for clarity and merging fiction with fact. And, streetwise as many of us may be, we'll sometimes find ourselves duped by some liars and skeptical of some straight shooters. Still, we still must try.

The stakes remain high. Even when Latinos are no longer openly treated as inferior beings, we're still most often regarded as imperfect or incomplete citizens. So many of us are recent immigrants, runs one explanation. So many of us remain politically apathetic, goes still another. And indeed we do have among us many new arrivals and many who don't vote when they should. But the deeper reality should not be
camouflaged. So long as we look and think and behave other than Anglo, we'll remain something less than fully equal in the eyes of still sizeable numbers of our fellows Americans. They recoil from the racial, cultural, and political implications of our mere presence, much less our rise to prominence.

[*416] Make no mistake. We Latinos seem to be yearning for a world we've only imagined and never possessed. At least judging by the LNPS, we can be fiercely patriotic and yet critical of the system. We see in our nation's lurid past, just as we see in our nation's romanticized projections, a call to create the future America. Such a vocation is as much obligation as opportunity. We wouldn't want it any other way, though. Little has come easily for us. And we're better equipped than ever before to tackle this gargantuan task. Along with the others in our country comfortable with the melange of people who now call themselves Americans, we'll inevitably remake what it means to be a good citizen. And we'll all be the better for it.

FOOTNOTE-1:


n7. The mail I received in response to Gerald P. Lopez, We Should Be Counted, Newsweek, Nov. 2, 1992, at 12 (mail on file with author) provides one good example. A wide array of observers focus on the centrality of black-white relations in political and social thought - some challenging the practice, others defending it, many engaging in it even as they insist we perhaps should change our habits. See, e.g., Harlon L. Dalton, Racial Healing: Confronting The Fear Between Blacks and Whites (1995); Manning Marable, Beyond Black and White (1995); Stephen Steinberg, Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy (1995); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1181 (1997); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1585 (1997), 10 La Raza L.J. 499 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 101 (1997); Rachel


n9. For a systematic treatment of how African Americans view coalitional prospects with other major racial and ethnic groups, particularly in Los Angeles, see Bryan O. Jackson et al., Coalitional Prospects in a Multi-Racial Society: African-American Attitudes Toward Other Minority Groups, 47 Pol. Res. Q. 277 (1994). From the African American perspective, the demographic transformation certainly seems to present economic and existential issues, sometimes cast in stark terms. See, e.g., Susan Anderson, A City Called Heaven: Black Enchantment and Despair in Los Angeles, in The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century 336, 346 (Allen J. Scott & Edward W. Soja eds., 1996) ("What we commonly knew of the Black community over the last twenty to thirty years was geographically presented, based on a cluster of neighborhoods with a concentrated majority of the city's black population... However, as demonstrated by the impact of diversified population growth, the notion of a geographically determined black community is no longer correct or viable."). But see John L. Mitchell, Tilting the Balance of Black Bank, L.A. Times, July 3, 1998, at A1 (describing African American-owned Broadway Federal Savings, long a banking mainstay in South Central, reaching out to Latinos and Asians - as customers, employees, and board members - as "part of our community").


n14. Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (1987); Alejandro Portes & Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (1993); Clara Rodriguez, Puerto


n18. Id. at 4-9.

n19. Id. at 1-4.

n20. For an account of the events that gave rise to this change, see Harvey M. Choldin, Statistics and Politics: The "Hispanic Issue" In The 1980 Census, 23 Demography 403 (1986).


n22. See, e.g., Choldin, supra note 20, at 404-407.

n23. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 3.

n24. Id.

n25. Id. at 2-4 (cataloging claims made by everyone from Linda Chavez to Republican and Democratic parties).

n26. Id. at 4-5.

n27. Id.

n28. Id. at 7.

n29. Id. at 7-8.

n30. Id. at 7-8, 219-229.

n31. Id. at 8-9.

n32. Id. at 9.
n33. Id. at 6-7.
n34. Id.
n35. Id. at 6.
n40. Id.
n41. Id. at 695.
n42. For statements drawing on such stereotyping, see, e.g., Linda R. Hayes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1994, at A18 (Hayes, the Southern California Media Director for Proposition 187, wrote a letter to the editor warning of California's adoption of Spanish as the sole language, the flight of its English-speaking residents, its secession from the United States, its formal annexation by Mexico, and its volatility under Mexican control).
n43. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 21-129.
n44. Id. at 1.
n45. Id. at 100-101.
n46. See, e.g., Suro, supra note 36.
n48. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 88-89.
n49. Id.
n50. Id.
n51. Id. at 100-102.
n52. For the LNPS authors' views of surveys as research tools, see Barrio Ballots: Latino Politics in the 1990 Elections xiii (Rodolfo O. de la Garza et al. eds., 1994).
n53. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 12.

n56. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 210, Question 136 in Appendix 1.


n60. See Jose Armas, Figures Don't Lie; Liars Figure, Albuquerque J., Jan. 24, 1993, at A1.

n61. Id.

n62. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.

n63. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 41-43, 10-11, 96-100.

n64. Id. 109-110.

n65. Id. 62-64.

n66. Id. at 71-73, 83-86, 113-120.


n68. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 106-107.

n69. Id.

n70. Id. at 111, 213.

n71. Id. at 102-104.


n73. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 7-8.


n75. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 66-69.
See, e.g., Stephen Chapman, American Latinos: Plunging Into the Melting Pot, Chi. Trib., Jan. 7, 1993, at A23 ("If Hispanics don't fit the xenophobic caricature of immutable aliens, neither do they match the left-wing portrait of an aggrieved and exploited minority, simmering over gringo injustices. Most say they have never encountered discrimination, and about 90 percent say that in their dealings with government agencies, they have been treated as well as everyone else.") For related LNPS findings, see Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 89-96.

See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 91-96. For one account juxtaposing the two views, see Suro, supra note 36.

The authors of the LNPS make the same point in their book, though not to my knowledge in their dealings with the media. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 66.


But see McDonnell, supra note 67.


For a recent lament, see Pamela Newirk, So Much for Newsroom Diversity, Nation, July 6, 1998, at 12.

For a controversial exploration of such issues, see James Fallows, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy (1996).

See, e.g., Suro, supra note 36; Rodriguez, supra note 58. For a later account of Latino immigration by one of the same journalists, see Roberto Suro, Strangers Among Us: How Latino Immigration is Transforming America (1998).


See Armas, supra note 60 (quoting Chris Garcia of the University of New Mexico).


I might just as productively have focused on other central dimensions of Latino life - say, the political economy, gender, or sexual orientation. For a glimpse of the rapidly growing literatures on these frequently intermingled forces, see e.g., Anzaldua, supra note 14; In The Barrios: Latinos and the Underclass Debate (Joan Moore & Raquel Pinderhughes eds., 1993); Kevin F. McCarthy & George Vernez, Immigration in a Changing Economy: California's Experience (1997); Cherrie Moraga, Loving in the War Years (1983); Elvia Arriola, Welcoming the Outsider to an Outsider Conference: Law and the Multiplicities of Self, 2 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 397 (1997); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Building Bridges - Latinas and

n91. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 16.

n92. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 38; Eaton, supra note 57.

n93. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 58.

n94. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 16.

n95. Id.

n96. Id. at 13-16.

n97. Id. at 66.


n99. My read of the authors' objectives finds support in some of the authors' own statements. See, e.g., de la Garza, supra note 89.


n101. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 15. For evidence that authors themselves do not always subscribe to such dichotomous thinking, see, e.g., de la Garza, supra note 89.


n105. See, e.g., Brimelow, supra note 104 (insisting that the coherent white Anglo Saxon "political nation" is now gravely threatened by today's immigration).

n106. See Kenneth Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (1989). For a discussion of how this played out in university education, see Levine, supra note 102, at 20-33.
n107. See Levine, supra note 102, at 109.

n108. For a discussion of Americanization programs, see Bill Ong Hing, To Be An American: Cultural Pluralism and the Rhetoric of Assimilation 18-31 (1997).

n109. See Levine, supra note 102, at 110, citing Lewis Gannett, Is America Anti-Semitic, Nation, Mar. 21, 1923, at 330-331.

n110. For the seminal case for cultural pluralism, see Horace Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples (1924).

n111. For apocalyptic visions of the demise of Anglo-America, see generally Brimelow, supra note 104; Geyer, supra note 104. For a recent assertion of the ideal underlying Americanization programs, note the objections recently raised by Ward Connerly and other University of California Regents to "ethnic graduation ceremonies" held in addition to the larger university-wide UC ceremony. See Kenneth R. Weiss, Mixing Commencement and Culture, L.A. Times, June 20, 1998, at A1 (quoting Regent Sue Johnson's observation that "getting away from where we come from is what America is all about."). For diverse responses, see Letters to the Editor, L.A. Times, June 24, 1998, at B6.

n112. See, e.g., Michelle Mittelstadt, Survey: Hispanics Prefer English, Want Immigration Cut, Record Journal, Dec. 16, 1992, A1; Rutten, supra note 67 ("Latino opinions on questions of immigration, bilingualism and ethnicity are indistinguishable from those of Anglos."). For one impression of "mainstream media" interpretations, see Armas, supra note 60.

n113. See, e.g., Interview of Rodolfo de la Garza by Frank Trejo, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 10, 1993, at J1.

n114. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 96-99.

n115. Id.


n118. See Lopez, supra note 54, at 694-702; Karst, supra note 98, at 183-184; Varat, supra note 98, at 572.


n120. In this sense, the authors certainly anticipated exceedingly confident statements by some scholars. See, e.g., Douglas Massey, Latinos, Poverty, and the Underclass: A New Agenda for Research, 15 Hispanic J. Behav. Res. 449, 453-454 (1993) ("There is no 'Hispanic' population in the sense that there is a black population. Hispanics share no common historical memory and do not comprise a single, coherent, community. Saying that someone is Hispanic or Latino reveals little or nothing about likely attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, race, religion, class, or legal situation in the United States. The only thing reasonably certain is that either the person in question or some progenitor once lived in an area originally colonized by Spain.").
n121. Later, in response to other interpretations of the LNPS data, the authors seemed more open about such subtleties. See, e.g., F. Chris Garcia, Angelo Falcon, & Rodolfo de la Garza, Introduction: Ethnicity and Politics: Evidence From the Latino National Political Survey, in Special Issue - Ethnicity and Politics: Evidence From the Latino National Political Survey, 18 J. Behav. Sci. 91-276 (F. Chris Garcia, Angelo Falcon, & Rodolfo de la Garza eds., 1996).


n124. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 198.


n126. For others insistent on the purportedly straightforward choice for Mexican Americans between white ethnic and racial minority status, see, e.g., Joseph Tilden Rhea, Race Pride and the American Identity 67-93 (1997).


n129. This admixture of race, culture, and political solidarity marks other races too. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 127, at 311-322. See also Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, Triumph and Tragedy: A History of the Mexican People (1992).


n134. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 21-23.


n137. See, e.g., Renato Rosaldo, Assimilation Revisited (Stanford Center for Chicano Studies Working Papers Series No. 9, 1985).

n138. For examples of literature examining aspects of Latino social mobility, see Tienda supra note 90; In The Barrios, supra note 90. For the contrast between those experts who regard Latino social mobility as indistinguishable from other "white ethnics" and those who, stressing past and present racial discrimination, describe a "blocked assimilation" in second- and third-generation Latinos, see Moran, supra note 1, at 1325-1326. For identification of distinct forms of assimilation, see Alejandro Portes & Min Zhou, Should immigrants assimilate?, 116 Public Interest 18 (1994).
n139. See Rosaldo, supra note 137, at 1.

n140. See supra notes 79 & 80 and accompanying text.

n141. For a recent invocation of the conventional model see, e.g., Gregory Rodriguez, The Emerging Latino Middle Class (Pepperdine University Institute for Public Policy and AT&T, 1996).

n142. These sketches draw from, among others, the following sources: Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua, The 1993 Plebiscite in Puerto Rico: The Story, The Results, and Their Implications (1993); James Jennings, Puerto Ricans in New York City (1977); David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (1987); Padilla, supra note 100; Alejandro Portes & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait (1996); Portes & Stepick, supra note 14; Rodriguez, supra note 14; Sanchez, supra note 15; Virginia E. Sanchez-Korrol, From Colonia to Community: The History of Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1917-1948 (1983); Kevin A. Hill & Dario Moreno, Second-Generation Cubans, 18 J. Behav. Sci. 175 (1996); Lopez, supra note 54; Alejandro Portes, Morning In Miami: A New Era for Cuban-American Politics, Am. Prospect 28 (May 1998).


n145. See generally Bender, supra note 143.

n146. See, e.g., Margaret E. Montoya, Law and Language(s): Image, Integration and Innovation, 7 La Raza L.J. 147 (1994).


n150. Id. See also Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights (1990); Ronald Wardhaugh, Languages in Competition (1987).

n151. See Valdes, supra note 149, at 4-6.

n152. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 8.

n153. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text.
n154. For these and other such fascinating details, see Martin Albert & Loraine K. Obler, The Bilingual Brain (1978); Jyotsna Vaid, Language Processing in Bilinguals: Psycholinguistic and Neuropsychological Perspectives (1986).

n155. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, at 96-100.

n156. See Valdes, supra note 149, at 34.


n158. For some conditions of such a world, see Moran, supra note 1, at 1342-43.


n160. See Latino Voices, supra note 17, 79-81.

n161. For a sample of views, see Dalton, supra note 7; Kennedy, supra note 87; Cornell West, Race Matters (1993); Patricia J. Williams, Seeing a Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race (1997); Regina Austin, The Black Community, Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769 (1992).


n164. See generally Lopez, supra note 116.


n166. See e.g., Special Issue - Ethnicity and Politics: Evidence From the Latino National Political Survey, supra note 121.